religious believers (for extensive cross-cultural replication of this effect, see Gervais et al., 2017) . Yet other research (Cook et al., 2015) has found that participants exposed to threats to their moral values (from reading text about societal moral decline) expressed more discriminatory views toward atheists than the control group. In addition, atheists were deemed more threatening to moral values (but not health-related or general values) than other groups (students; gay men/HIV patients/Muslims, averaged). Similarly, Franks and Scherr (2014) found that Christian (but not nonreligious) participants expressed less willingness to vote for atheists than for Blacks, gays, or White/heterosexual Christians, whereas similar results emerged for measures of perceived threat from, and feelings of trust and disgust toward, these out-groups. Finally, Brown-Iannuzzi, McKee, and Gervais (2018) even found evidence that mental imagery of atheists is more negative than that of theists. After one sample of participants rated images of faces as more likely to be either atheist or theist, a second sample judged the atheist images as less religious (manipulation check); more untrustworthy, immoral, incompetent, and cold; and less likeable, happy, and attractive. In short, much research documents (a) automatic associations between atheism and immorality, and (b) perceptions that atheists (more than other groups) pose threats to trust and moral values (more than to other concerns).
But according to recent theoretical advances and much empirical evidence, the psychology of moral judgment can arguably be broken down into various types of moral concern. Moral foundations theory (Graham et al., 2013) posits five core domains of moral intuition, each having evolved to meet certain adaptive needs of social coordination. The domains are moral intuitions for caring, compassion, and aversion to harm (Care); fairness, rights, and aversion to cheating (Fairness); in-group loyalty (Loyalty); respect for authority, tradition, and social order (Authority); and moral concerns for cleanliness, purity, decency, and naturalness (Sanctity). A wide range of research has supported the basic tenets of moral foundations theory and demonstrated considerable utility in a moral-foundations approach to understanding moral intuitions, moral judgments, and intergroup moral stereotypes (see Graham et al., 2013 , for a review). For example, Feinberg and Willer (2013) found that political conservatives (but not liberals) showed increased concern for environmental harm when it was framed in terms of environmental "degradation," suggesting that adding the unique content of Sanctity foundation concerns created added motivation for moral disapproval-over and above the unique content of Care foundation concerns for environmental "harm"-among individuals (conservatives) who typically value notions of purity/sanctity relatively strongly. Among other evidence suggesting that different types of morality are processed differently in the mind, Graham et al. (2011) found that each moral foundation (vis-à-vis individual differences in endorsement) revealed idiosyncratic patterns of association with moral judgments of various social groups. For example, a general endorsement of the Sanctity foundation correlated with harsh attitudes toward certain groups (e.g., prostitutes) but not others (e.g., hunters), whereas a general endorsement of the Care foundation revealed the opposite pattern of correlations.
Combining these two lines of inquiry (i.e., antiatheist prejudice and domains of moral intuition),  hereafter SR2017) investigated whether antiatheist prejudice varies according to perceived atheist endorsement of the five moral foundations. In one correlational and one experimental study, they found that the link between antiatheist prejudice and perceived atheist (im) morality was best explained by perceived atheist endorsement of the Care foundation. Participants (Christian theists) were less prejudiced against atheists if they believed that atheists value caring and compassion, but varying belief in the degree to which atheists value other types of morality revealed little to no relationship with prejudice.
In this article, we (a) further investigate the question of causality (perceived atheist concern for Care causes reductions in antiatheist prejudice), and (b) replicate correlational findings crossnationally. We also (c) reapply the methodology of SR2017 to explore whether perceived moral foundation endorsement predicts prejudice differently depending on the out-group in question (here, atheists or Jews). Sociofunctional theories of prejudice (e.g., Cook et al., 2015; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) argue that, because different out-groups pose different perceived threats to the ingroup, the psychological factors undergirding prejudice will vary depending on the out-group in question (and the nature of the threat perceived to be posed by that out-group). As perceived outgroup immorality is one source of perceived threat, and as scarce prior research has addressed the sociofunctionalist perspective through the lens of moral foundations theory, the present research adds to the growing literature of both theories.
We hypothesized, in Study 1, that (a) manipulating perceived atheist concern versus lack of concern for the Care foundation (but not the Sanctity foundation) will affect attitudes toward atheists, such that perceiving atheists to endorse versus not endorse Care foundation morality will lead to different levels of antiatheist prejudice but perceiving atheists to endorse versus not endorse Sanctity foundation morality will not. We did not make predictions regarding which condition (perceived concern and/or lack of concern for Care) would drive this effect, as both seem theoretically plausible. In Study 2, we hypothesized that (a) the correlational findings of SR2017 (namely, that individual differences in perceived atheist endorsement of Care, but not of other moral foundations, will uniquely predict antiatheist prejudice) would be replicated in a nationally different sample (viz., Australian theists). Finally, in accordance with the sociofunctional perspective on prejudice, we hypothesized in Study 2 that (c) a different pattern of correlations would emerge for a different target group (Jews). We made no formal predictions as to which moral foundations (and the perceived Jewish endorsement of such) would most strongly correlate with anti-Jewish prejudice; rather, we treated this as an exploratory concern.
For both studies, data and materials can be found at https://osf.io/p7vnb/, and we report all measures, conditions, and data exclusions (some measures are reported only in the supplementary materials). We relied on convenience samples and participants' self-selection for both studies; hence, sample sizes were not predetermined. However, to aid statistical power, we sought a minimum of 40 participants per cell in Study 1.
Study 1: Conceptual experimental replication
SR2017 found that only Care foundation manipulations affected antiatheist prejudice. In a 2 (social context) × 5 (moral foundation) design, participants were told that either atheists or "people in general" strongly endorse one of the five moral foundations. Participants judged atheists least (/most) harshly when led to believe that atheists (/people in general) strongly endorse Care but not other foundations. In the present study, using a 2 (endorsement) × 2 (moral foundation) design, participants were told that atheists either strongly or weakly endorse either Care or Sanctity. By including a weakly endorse morality condition, this provides a more stringent test of SR2017's conclusions, because perceived neglect of morality (of any type) should in theory elicit harsh judgment (especially given that both Care and Sanctity are important in U.S. Christians' moral values; Graham & Haidt, 2010; Simpson & Rios, 2016) .
Method

Participants
We recruited participants via Amazon's Mechanical Turk. First, however, we prescreened for (a) U.S. Christian theists who (b) had not completed any similar prior study (including those in SR2017 and those in a file-drawered study described in the General Discussion section). Despite such prescreening conditions, we were able to recruit 200 participants. As per SR2017, we removed eight participants for failing an attention check, a further 18 who didn't believe the manipulation, a further eight who correctly suspected the experimental design, and one more who completed the survey four times (thus constituting four cases). (See the following section for how we detected participants who didn't believe the manipulation or suspected it was fake.) This left a final sample of 162 participants (67 male, 95 female; M age = 38.2, SD = 17.2; 60 Protestants, 32 Catholics, 29 Baptists, 41 "Christianother"). The sample included 119 participants identifying as White, 19 as Black/African American, 10 as Hispanic/Latino, 11 as Asian American/Pacific Islander, 1 as Native American, and two identifying as "other."
Materials and procedure
Similar to SR2017, we first asked participants to complete either the six Care items or the five 1 Sanctity items from the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) . We then explained that "the items you have just completed measure moral concerns for [caring/compassion] [naturalness/purity]" and that our previous research found atheists generally scored very (high/low) on these items. To minimize suspicion, we had participants spend 1-2 min writing about what they thought of these findings, ostensibly because that was our primary research interest. Also, we included a suspicion probe at the end of the survey ("Very briefly, what do you think this study was about?"). Each participant's combined response to these two open-ended questions was coded to ensure that we included in the analyses only participants who (a) believed the manipulation and (b) did not express suspicion regarding the experimental design. (See https://osf.io/p7vnb/for participants' open-ended responses.)
We then included the same measures of attitudes toward atheists as in SR2017, in random order. This included Gervais's (2011) two-item measure of distrust ("Atheists are dishonest" and "Atheists are trustworthy"; M = 3.42, SD = 1.47) and seven-item Negative Attitudes toward Atheists scale (NATA; e.g., "Societies function better if everyone believes in God"; M = 4.43, SD = 1.43), both measured on 7-point scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). We also measured general feelings toward atheists (0 = very cold, 100 = very warm; M = 51.5, SD = 26.2) and perceived atheist morality (0 = very immoral, 100 = very moral; M = 51.5, SD = 25.4). To simplify our reports of the analyses, we collapsed these four measures (α = .88), after reverse-coding general feelings and perceived atheist morality and standardizing all measures, to form a measure of general antiatheist prejudice (as in SR2017). 2 Finally, we included Preston and Epley's (2005) four-item measure of Belief in God (1 = not at all, 11 = extremely; M = 9.10, SD = 2.27) and we measured religious attendance (1 = never, 6 = every week/more than once a week; M = 3.60, SD = 1.65), prayer frequency (1 = never, 7 = more than once a day; M = 5.22, SD = 1.74), and the item "People behave better when they believe God is watching them" (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M = 5.16, SD = 1.81).
Results and discussion
In a series of analyses of variance, there were no significant differences across conditions regarding religiosity (Fs < 1.59, ps > .210), except that participants in the two Strong Endorsement conditions (M = 9.44, SD = 1.80) had marginally higher Belief in God scores compared to participants in the two "atheists weakly endorse" conditions (M = 8.77, SD = 2.60), F(1, 160) = 3.58, p = .060, η p 2 = .022. Hence, we controlled for Belief in God in our focal analyses (we also report covariate-free analyses).
We then ran a 2 × 2 analysis of covariance, controlling for Belief in God, to predict General Antiatheist Prejudice. With 162 participants, four conditions, one covariate, and alpha set at 0.05, we had 80% power to detect a small-to-medium-sized effect (η p 2 = .047) and 60% power to detect an effect of the size reported in SR2017's Study 2 (η p 2 = .030). The Foundation main effect was not significant (F < 1), but the Endorsement main effect was, F(1, 157) = 18.01, p < .001, η p 2 = .103: It was unsurprising that participants expressed less prejudice when told that atheists strongly endorse moral values, be they Care or Sanctity values. Of central importance, these effects were qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 157) = 4.66, p = .032, η p 2 = .029. Intriguingly, this effect was much stronger when we analyzed only White participants' responses: F(1, 114) = 7.64, p = .007, η p 2 = .063; without the Belief in God covariate: F(1, 115) = 6.83, p = .010, η p 2 = .056. Although this (η p 2 = .029) constitutes a "small" effect (accompanied by a p value that is perhaps somewhat large by modern standards of "significant"), recall that we described atheists as caring about 1 One Sanctity item explicitly mentioned the importance of God's moral approval, which is incongruent with atheism. Hence, we excluded this from the present manipulation and from analyses in Study 2 (as in SR2017). 2 We also included a measure of perceived atheist category discreteness (e.g., "Agnostics are fooling themselves and should make up their minds"), but research post-SR2017 suggests that this is technically not a measure of prejudice but rather a predictor of prejudice (Simpson, Rios, & Cowgill, 2017) . Nevertheless, When we included this measure in the composite measure of prejudice, the Endorse × Foundation interaction effect on that composite remained significant, F(1, 157) = 4.49, p = .036, η p 2 = .028, and the effect size changed negligibly (change in η p 2 = −.001).
versus not caring about morality, which in theory should yield large differences in judgments of the target regardless of the type of morality. It is thus unsurprising that we see an overall main effect of the Endorsement manipulation, and this suggests that more insight can be gained by comparing Care and Sanctity conditions regarding the simple effects of Endorsement. The simple effect was large in the Care condition, F(1, 157) = 20.91, p < .0001, η p 2 = .118, but small and nonsignificant in the Sanctity condition, F(1, 157) = 2.20, p = .140, η p 2 = .014. Among White participants only: Care, F(1, 114) = 28.44, p < .0001, η p 2 = .200; Sanctity F(1, 114) = 1.83, p = .179, η p 2 = .016. In analyses without the Belief in God covariate, although the Foundation × Endorsement interaction only trended toward significance, F(1, 158) = 2.90, p = .091, η p 2 = .018, the same pattern emerged: The simple effect of Endorsement in the Care condition, F(1, 158) = 10.38, p = .002, η p 2 = .062, was 16.4 times larger than that in the Sanctity condition (F < 1, p = .441, η p 2 = .004). Among White participants only: Care, F(1, 115) = 18.87, p < .0001, η p 2 = .141; Sanctity, F(1, 115) = .357, p = .551, η p 2 = .003. These findings thus support Hypothesis 1: Perceiving atheists to endorse versus not endorse Care foundation morality led to different levels of antiatheist prejudice, but perceiving atheists to endorse versus not endorse Sanctity foundation morality did not. (Effects remained unchanged when controlling for participants' responses to Care foundation and/or Sanctity foundation items, which were used as part of the manipulation.) Figure 1 displays effects (full sample: both Whites and non-Whites) on the four measures of prejudice, clearly showing that significant effects of Endorsement were mostly confined to (and much stronger in) the Care foundation condition. Of interest, effects appear to have been driven more by the strongly "endorse" than the "don't endorse" condition, suggesting that perceived atheist caring and compassion is not a default view among U.S. Christians. Hence, increasing such perceptions (in the "atheists endorse Care" condition) reduced antiatheist prejudice. In contrast, the "atheists weakly endorse Care" condition did not increase antiatheist prejudice and may have simply reflected a preexisting, baseline view among participants that atheists are callous and uncaring.
We note, however, two caveats. First, statistical power was relatively low. With strict prescreening conditions (Christian theists who had not taken any of our prior studies), there was a relatively small population of participants available to participate (e.g., approximately 1,000 participants had completed our prior studies; see SR2017 and the Opening the File Drawer subsection in the General Discussion section). Second, because we interpret both significant and nonsignificant effects, further information can be gained from Bayesian analysis. Although this revealed an effect consistent with those just reported (the Foundation × Endorsement interaction effect yielded BF 10 = 1.02 when compared to the null model and BF 10 = 1.16 when compared to the best-fitting model), this effect was small. Hence, although consistent with established findings of SR2017, these results should be interpreted with caution. (Concerns regarding statistical power and Bayesian analysis are reduced in Study 2.) Intriguingly, however, the Foundation × Endorsement interaction effect was much stronger when we only included White participants in the analysis (η p 2 = .063), and this analysis yielded a much more impressive Bayes factor (BF 10 = 11.34, compared against the null model) and post hoc power (78%) regarding the interaction effect. We have limited scope to interpret this effect (and we note that, when collapsing experimental conditions, the 119 Whites did not differ from the 43 non-Whites on any measure of prejudice-ts < .95, ps > .347-or any demographic measure, ts < 1.20, ps > .234). Nevertheless, this finding suggests that our results and interpretations may not be constrained by concerns of statistical power and that, in fact, the effect of concern (specific types of morality dominate in the link between prejudice and perceived atheist morality) is quite strong among the U.S. majority (approximately 76% of Americans identify as mono-racial White [U.S. Census Bureau, 2017], and Whites constitute the majority of U.S. Christians [Pew Research Center, n.d.] ). Future research should further investigate how members of different races/ethnicities process and respond to information about atheists and atheist (im)morality-something that has received little attention in existing research on attitudes toward atheists (but see Gervais et al., 2017 , for cross-national analyses).
Study 2: Cross-national replication
To gain further insight into the prejudice-perceived immorality link, we reran SR2017's Study 1 among Australian theists. Although Australia shares much in common with the United States, religion is generally treated with far less importance in Australia. According to Pew (2018), far fewer Australians than U.S. Americans say that religion is very important in their lives (18% vs. 53%), pray daily (18% vs. 55%), and attend religious services weekly (17% vs. 36%). Important to note, far fewer Australians believe that religious belief is an essential precondition for moral behavior (23% vs. 53%; Pew, 2014). Hence, replication in an Australian sample would entail replication in a culture with vastly different attitudes toward religion and secularism.
For exploratory/comparative purposes, we also assessed the prejudice-perceived immorality link with an alternative target group: Jews. This allowed us to explore a social-functionalist account of intergroup prejudice, which argues that prejudice toward different out-groups is precipitated by different psychological processes because different out-groups pose different perceived threats to the in-group (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) .
Method
Participants
Ninety-seven undergraduates at an urban Australian university completed an online survey. Participants reported their religious identification by choosing from a list of 11 options (see Supplementary  Materials) . We removed three self-identified atheists and nine participants who failed three randomly placed attention checks (e.g., "Click strongly agree so we know you're paying attention"), leaving 85 for analysis (30 male; M age = 20.1, SD = 4.9), including 49 Christians, 9 Muslims, 3 Hindus, 10 Buddhists, 10 self-identified "agnostics" (who nonetheless expressed belief in God in other measures, and thus were not atheists), and 4 selecting "other" (zero Jews). (Note that as Australia is relatively secular [Pew, 2014] and because the university's location is very diverse culturally, it was impractical to recruit only Christians, as in SR2017. 3 ) With 85 participants, and setting alpha at 0.05 in a two-tailed correlation test, this provided approximately 100% power to detect an effect of r = .50 (which was the size of the correlation between General Antiatheist Prejudice and perceived atheist endorsement of the Care foundation, as reported in SR2017's Study 1) and 82% power to detect a medium-sized effect (r = .30).
Materials and procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to complete atheist or Jewish measures first (later, we controlled for order effects in our analyses). They first completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) from a typical atheist's/Jew's perspective (αs = .60-.78) 4 and then completed measures of prejudice; this process was then repeated with measures pertaining to the remaining target group. For atheist targets, prejudice measures were the same four measures just described in Study 1. 5 This included Gervais's (2011) two-item measure of Distrust (M = 3.30, SD = 1.02) and seven-item NATA (M = 3.66, SD = 1.05), both measured on 7-point scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). We also measured General Feelings toward atheists (0 = very cold, 100 = very warm; M = 58.1, SD = 20.8) and Perceived Atheist Morality (0 = very immoral, 100 = very moral; M = 56.4, SD = 18.7). To simplify analyses, we collapsed these four measures (α = .78), after reverse-coding the latter two and standardizing all measures, to form a measure of General Antiatheist Prejudice (as in SR2017 and the present Study 1).
For a comparable measure of anti-Jewish prejudice, we used any aforementioned item that could be reworded. 6 This included Gervais's (2011) two-item measure of Distrust (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M = 3.30, SD = 1.07), two items from Gervais's (2011) NATA ("I would be uncomfortable with a Jewish person teaching my child" and "I would not at all be bothered by a Prime Minster who was Jewish"; 3 Comparing Whites/non-Whites (as in Study 1) was difficult because participants were asked to indicate ethnicity, not race (and many simply wrote "Australian"). Also, the sample's religious diversity presents a potential confound when treating race or ethnicity as independent variables. Please contact the first author for further information. 4 Except for perceived atheist endorsement of Authority (α = .48), which was unreliable even after dropping the weakest-loading items. Excluding this composite from multiple regressions did not impact any other effect size. 5 In addition to the four measures, we included Category Discreteness beliefs to match SR2017's Study 1 exactly. As is evident in Table 1 , including (see the As in SR2017 columns) or excluding (see Common DVs columns) this measure had a negligible impact on effects. 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M = 3.02, SD = 1.45), General Feelings (0 = very cold, 100 = very warm; M = 65.1, SD = 18.8), and Perceived Morality (0 = very immoral, 100 = very moral; M = 66.7, SD = 17.4). We collapsed these scales (after reverse-coding the latter two and standardizing all measures) to form a measure of Anti-Jewish Prejudice (α = .82). Finally, we measured similar demographic information as in Study 1. We also included additional measures (e.g., benevolent vs. vengeful beliefs about God 7 ) for exploratory purposes beyond the scope of the present research.
Results and discussion
Zero-and first-order associations, as well as Bayes factors, are displayed in Table 1 (controlling for presentation order of atheist/Jewish targets, which generally yielded nonsignificant effects). Most important, Hypothesis 2 was supported, as the central effect of SR2017's Study 1 was clearly replicated: Perceived atheist endorsement of Care was the strongest predictor of antiatheist prejudice (and the only one to consistently reach traditional levels of significance across all pertinent analyses). There was also mixed evidence for a smaller (and positive) effect of perceived Sanctity endorsement, which is also consistent with SR2017. Comparing effects on antiatheist and anti-Jewish prejudice, zero-and first-order effects of perceived Care endorsement are similar in size, perhaps reflecting the prioritization of Care foundation morality in Western cultures (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012) . Important to note, however, other effects differed across target groups, thus supporting Hypothesis 3. Whereas perceived Care endorsement was clearly the strongest predictor of antiatheist prejudice, perceived Care and Loyalty endorsement both predicted anti-Jewish prejudice, and to similar degrees. This suggests that Jewish emphasis on both compassion and group commitment (e.g., patriotism) can, to similar degrees, reduce anti-Jewish prejudice, but antiatheist prejudice Table 1 . Zero-order correlations and standardized regression coefficients (and Bayesian factors, BF 10 ; Study 2: Australian sample).
General antiatheist prejudice (as in SR2017)
General antiatheist prejudice (common DVs) a General anti-Jewish prejudice (common DVs) a β β β r
Step 1 Step 2 r
Step 1 When a nine-item composite of belief in a vengeful God (e.g., wrathful) was regressed onto all five perceived atheist endorsement predictors, perceived atheist Care endorsement was a marginally significant predictor (β = −.31, p = .057; other predictors βs < .15, ps > .300). Also, a nine-item composite of belief in a benevolent God (e.g., caring) correlated with perceived atheist endorsement of Fairness, r(83) = .28, p = .010. No other significant zero-or first-order associations emerged. Most important, neither vengeful nor benevolent beliefs about God mediated or moderated the link between antiatheist prejudice and perceived atheist endorsement of any moral foundation.
can be reduced only via atheist emphasis on compassion (and, intriguing to note, perhaps a deemphasis on Sanctity).
General discussion
Two studies replicated the central findings of SR2017, again suggesting that perceived atheist morality predicts attitudes toward atheists primarily when the type of morality in question involves moral concerns for kindness, caring, and compassion. This is despite the important role of all moral foundations in most religious doctrines (e.g., Graham & Haidt, 2010) and despite evidence that Christians stereotype atheists as endorsing all moral foundations to a lesser degree compared to Christians (Simpson & Rios, 2016) . This report extends SR2017 in several ways. First, results replicated across countries: In both the United States and Australia, the link between antiatheist prejudice and perceived atheist immorality was strongest via moral concerns for compassion and caring. However, despite important differences in religiosity between Australia and the United States, both are developed Western nations. Hence, there is a "constraint on generality" (see Simons, Shoda, & Lindsay, 2017) : Despite evidence that perceived immorality undergirds antiatheist prejudice across diverse cultures (Gervais et al., 2017) , we don't know whether Care foundation morality is central to this phenomenon in other cultures. Hence, more research is needed to ascertain cross-cultural differences in the association between prejudice toward and perceived morality of atheists. (We note, however, our own lack of success investigating these research questions with online samples of Indian Hindus, as the moral foundations composites were statistically unreliable.)
Second, Study 1 found that only the condition in which atheists were described as valuing Care affected antiatheist prejudice. This suggests that a perceived lack of compassion is somewhat of a default view, and changing this view can change levels of prejudice.
Third, and supporting social-functionalist perspectives on prejudice, the prejudice-perceived immorality link varies depending on the target out-group: In Study 2, whereas Care defined this link with atheist targets, both Care and Loyalty equivalently defined this link with Jewish targets. The role of perceived Loyalty endorsement in anti-Jewish prejudice in unsurprising given that Jews are sometimes stereotyped as insular and segregated from broader society. The Loyalty items in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire address not just family loyalty but also loyalty to the broader societal in-group regarding patriotism, national pride, and a general aversion to individualism. Hence, these findings suggest that perceiving Jews to show loyalty to the national or societal in-group, rather than just to fellow Jews, predicts lower levels of anti-Jewish prejudice. Future research could explore this line of inquiry further by untangling these two types of loyalty-a worthy goal given historically high rates of Antisemitism as well as a high degree of in-group solidarity common to Jewish communities around the world.
We should also note that we focused on associations (i.e., between attitudes and perceived outgroup morality), not on baseline means (e.g., mean perceived atheist endorsement of Sanctity). For a more comprehensive analysis of the latter, see Simpson and Rios (2016) .
Why is care/harm central?
Two questions in particular arise regarding these findings. First, why don't attitudes toward atheists covary with perceived atheist endorsement of any type of morality? After all, Gervais (2014) found that moral violations were more readily attributed to atheists than to other groups regardless of the moral foundation of interest. However, Gervais (2014) focused on implicit associations (between atheism and immorality), comparing different social groups. In contrast, we focus on stereotypes of atheists' moral values. Regarding the former, evidence clearly suggests that implicit associations between atheism and immorality are strong, persist regardless of the moral foundation in question (Gervais, 2014) , and replicate across several diverse cultures (Gervais et al., 2017) . But this line of research does not address the questions asked in the present research: How do the five moral foundations differ in terms of (a) how moral stereotypes of atheists covary with antiatheist prejudice, and (b) the prospects of reducing antiatheist prejudice by depicting atheists in a moral light? We find evidence that antiatheist prejudice emerging from automatic atheism-immorality associations may be best reduced if depictions of atheist morality focus on Care, not other moral foundations.
Second, why Care/harm in particular? One possibility is that all moral judgments really just boil down to perceiving harm (Schein & Gray, 2018) , meaning that explicit depictions of atheist aversion to harm (rather than aversion to cheating, betrayal, subversion, or degradation) are more likely to quell concerns about perceived atheist immorality. However, this would also implicate Care as central in explaining how moral stereotypes predict attitudes toward other social groups. But we found evidence that Care is not central when the target group was Jews (Loyalty was also important), whereas SR2017 found (in a supplemental study) evidence that Sanctity is central in judgments of gay men. Hence, although more research is needed in applying moral foundations to sociofunctional theories of prejudice, evidence herein suggests that Care-based morality is not always central in sociofunctional mechanisms of prejudice.
In contrast, another interpretation derives from the apparent fact that Care foundation content reflects the most valued and prevalent moral concerns in current Western society (Gray et al., 2012) . (For evidence that other moral foundations may have been prioritized in other cultures and times, see, e.g., Haidt, 2012; Pinker, 2011.) Hence, among contemporary Westerners, stereotypes based on vague terms such as "moral" or "immoral" may activate Care/harm considerations more than considerations of other moral foundations. Under this interpretation, Care/harm undergirds the attitudes-perceived morality link regarding attitudes toward atheists but not attitudes toward other out-groups because it is atheists, and not these other groups, that are stereotyped with general notions of immorality (Gervais, 2014) . Ultimately, however, this interpretation requires further empirical support (and cross-cultural replication in cultures in which Care is likely not the primary moral foundation of concern). Real-world applications Rarely if ever should a group be blamed for its own marginalization, but stereotypes of atheist immorality are pervasive and deep-seated (Gervais, 2014) . Hence, our suggestions focus on behavioral strategies for atheists themselves. In situations in which atheism is a salient identifier (e.g., atheist meetings, interfaith dialogue, student or workplace discussions about religion), atheists may benefit from applying the present research findings to how they approach such situations. Atheists could, for example, include discussion of their own charitable behaviors (e.g., volunteer work), famous and morally praiseworthy atheists, and important statistics such as the likely underrepresentation of atheists in the incidence of violent crimes (Zuckerman, 2009 ). In addition, atheism may have suffered from having as figureheads "militant atheists" such as Richard Dawkins, Lawrence Krauss, and Christopher Hitchens. Hence, negative stereotypes of atheists may be reduced if atheism were more readily associated with famous individuals who benefit from a public image of caring and compassion (e.g., Bill Gates and Stephen Fry have publicly identified as skeptical of theism and as an atheist, respectively). Perhaps, therefore, there is onus on such public figures to be more vocal about their atheism.
Opening the file drawer
One study similar to Study 1 was conducted prior to Study 1; that studyincluded 269 participants across six conditions. Using the same style of manipulation as in Study 1, in a 3 (moral foundation) × 2 (similar vs. different) design, we led participants to believe that Christians and atheists value either Care, Authority, or Purity to either similar or different degrees. The results appear to be inconsistent with the present research-perceived Christian-atheist differences led to increased prejudice against atheists when Authority or Sanctity (but not Care) was the moral foundation of interest. However, we believe this manipulation was ambiguous: "Different degrees" could be interpreted to mean that either atheists or Christians value the particular moral foundation more strongly than the other group, and the actual degrees of foundation endorsement are left unspecified.
We also contend that this study likely addresses a different line of research questions, because it prompts comparative processing of in-group/out-group (rather than simply processing the outgroup). This emphasis on intergroup differences likely explains the unexpected results. In addition, given Simpson and Rios's (2016) finding that atheist-Christian differences are seen as largest for Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity foundations (but not Care and Fairness), it makes sense that highlighting these foundations in a manipulation of atheist-Christian difference versus similarity led to effects on antiatheist prejudice.
Conclusion
Antiatheist prejudice has only recently gained attention in the social sciences. Given the increasing recognition of religion as central to human cultural evolution and societal expansion (Norenzayan et al., 2016) , further investigation of such prejudice may prove important in our understanding of various social phenomena. Moreover, atheists are increasingly common as society continues to secularize, whereas both implicit (Gervais, 2014) and explicit (Edgell et al., 2016) prejudice against atheists remain common. Although moral distrust is central to antiatheist prejudice, the present findings suggest that perceptions of atheist compassion may prove indispensable in real-world efforts to curb hostility toward atheists.
